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DOUBLE JEOPARDY
juror to have continued after a short amount of time, 96 a brief
continuance could have been a viable alternative to a mistrial. 97
The New York State Court of Appeals did, however, hold that
there was "manifest necessity" for the judge to declare a mistrial
in People v. Paquette.98 In Paquette, the prosecution was unable
to produce its witnesses because of threats made to the witnesses
by the defendant's uncle. 99 The court reasoned that "[i]f the act
of a defendant himself aborts a trial, he ought not readily be
heard to say that by frustrating the trial he had succeeded in
erecting a constitutional shelter based on double jeopardy." 100
It is clear from the aforementioned federal and state cases that
the rules governing when a retrial is prohibited pursuant to the
federal and state Double Jeopardy Clauses are clearly congruous
in their application. Both courts will preclude a retrial when a
mistrial is granted by the court without the consent of or over the
objection of the defendant "unless there was a 'manifest
necessity' for the mistrial, or 'the ends of public justice would
otherwise be defeated."' 10 1
People v. MayI02
(decided June 10, 1996)
Defendant, Nathan May, was convicted in 1988 of murder in
the second degree, attempted murder in the second degree and
assault in the first degree.103 He was sentenced to consecutive
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 31 N.Y.2d 379, 380, 292 N.E.2d 17, 18, 339 N.Y.S.2d 959. 960
(1972).
99. Id.
37. Id.
101. See Perez, 22 U.S. at 580; Boneta, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 443.
102. 644 N.Y.S.2d 525 (2d Dep't 1996).
103. Id. at 526. The New York statute for murder in the second degree is
embodied in New York Penal Law § 125.25. N.Y. PEAL LAW § 125.25
(McKinney 1996). The New York statute for assault in the first degree is
1997] 739
1
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prison terms of twenty-five years to life on the murder
convictions, eight and one-third years to twenty-five years on the
attempted murder conviction and a concurrent sentence of five
years to fifteen years on the conviction of assault. 104
Defendant appealed, claiming that the verdict should be set
aside on the grounds that: (1) promises were made to an
eyewitness in consideration of his testimony and the District
Attorney failed to disclose this arrangement to the defendant and
(2) the District Attorney failed to correct the witness' lie that no
arrangement had been made. 105  The defendant additionally
contended that the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States
Constitution1 0 6 and the New York Constitution 107 require
dismissal of the indictment. 108
In a memorandum opinion, the Appellate Division, Second
Department reversed the lower court's denial of a new trial.109
The court held that the prosecutor's errors at trial were not
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,"ll0 however, the
embodied in New York Penal Law § 120.10. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25
(McKinney 1996)).
104. People v. May, 164 Misc. 2d 54, 56, 623 N.Y.S.2d 515, 516 (Sup.
Ct. Queens County 1995), rev'd, 644 N.Y.S.2d 525 (2d Dep't 1996).
105. May, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 526.
106. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "No person shall be ... subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb." Id.
107. N.Y. CONST. art. I. § 6. Article I, § 6 of the New York State
Constitution provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be subject to be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense. ... " Id.
108. May, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 526.
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing People v. Steadman, 82 N.Y.2d 1, 623 N.E.2d 509, 603
N.Y.S.2d 382 (1993)). In Steadman, the prosecution did not disclose that an
assistant district attorney promised the witness that he would not go to prison
for unrelated pending charges against him if he testified against the defendant.
Id. at 5, 623 N.E.2d at 510, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 383. The court held that the
error was not harmless, pointing out that the witness' credibility was "pivotal"
as he was the only identification witness. Id. at 8, 623 N.E.2d at 512-13, 603
N.Y.S.2d at 385 (citing People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 326 N.E.2d
787, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1975)). The Crimmins court explained that an error
is not harmless if there is a reasonable possibility that it contributed to a
[Vol 13740
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protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clauses did not apply
as there was no indication that the prosecutor's error was made
with "bad faith intent." 111
Allen Jordan, a witness to May's acts, testified for the
prosecution at May's trial.1 12  Jordan had already been
convicted, by plea, of attempted burglary in the second degree
and criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fifth degree. 113
In exchange for his testimony at Nathan May's trial (for
unrelated charges), 114 Jordan was promised a one year sentence
for each conviction. 115 At trial, Jordan testified that "no deals or
promises had been made, however, he was told his sentence
would be one (1) year.",116
The defendant appealed, arguing that the prosecution's error is
grounds for vacating the judgment of conviction against him, and
the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Federal and New York State
Constitutions require dismissal of the indictment. 117
In response to the first contention, the court noted that the
prosecution conceded in its error of failing to disclose the
arrangement and failing to correct Jordan's testimony.1 18 The
court concluded that the prosecution's error was not harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt and reversed the defendant's
conviction. 119 Dealing with the second contention, the court
held that the Double Jeopardy Clauses relied upon by the
defendant, did not bar a retrial. 120
conviction, no matter how strong the evidence. Id. at 240-41, 326 N.E.2d at
793, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
111. Id. (citing United States v. Wallach, 979 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1992);
People v. Mitchell, 197 A.D.2d 709, 602 N.Y.S.2d 923 (2d Dep't 1993);
People v. Copeland, 127 A.D.2d 846, 511 N.Y.S.2d 949 (2d Dep't 1987)).
112. May, 164 Misc. 2d at 57, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. May, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 526.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
1997]
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In United States v. Wallach,12 1 after a four month jury trial,
the defendants were convicted of racketeering, mail fraud,
interstate transportation of stolen property and conspiracy to
violate federal conflict of interest law. 122 At trial, Anthony
Guariglia testified against the defendants. 123 On direct
examination, he testified that he had stopped his compulsive
gambling in the summer of 1988.124 On cross-examination
however, he admitted to signing gambling markers in September
and October of 1988 at an Atlantic City casino. 125 On redirect,
he restated he had stopped gambling the summer of 1988.126
After Wallach's conviction, the government acquired additional
evidence sufficient to indict and convict Guariglia of perjury. 127
While Wallach's conviction was reversed on the ground that
the government should have known that Guariglia was
committing perjury, the United States Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit, determined that a retrial was not barred. 128 The court
explained that generally a "defendant who secures a reversal of
his conviction because of a defect in the proceedings leading to
conviction normally obtains from the Double Jeopardy Clause no
insulation against retrial.,, 129 The court further explained that
there are two exceptions: (1) "a reversal for insufficiency of the
evidence at trial" and (2) "in some circumstances involving
misconduct by a prosecutor., 130 The United States Court of
Appeals concluded that neither exception applied in this case. 131
In construing the protection afforded by the second exception,
the New York cases cited to by the May court held that absent a
121. 979 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1992).
122. Id. at 913.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 913-14.
126. Id. at 914.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 917.
129. Id. at 915.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 917.
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bad faith intent to provoke a mistrial, the misconduct of
prosecutors did not bar a retrial. 132
In People v. Copeland,133 the defendant was arrested for
possession of a loaded gun. 13 4 On the night of his arrest, the
defendant remained silent for three hours and fifteen minutes
before giving a statement. 135 The trial court ruled that the
prosecutors were precluded from impeaching the defendant's trial
testimony by introducing evidence of his silence. 136 Despite the
court's instructions, the prosecutor referred to the defendant's
silence at trial. 137 The Appellate Division, Second Department,
held that the evidence did not support a finding that the
prosecutor's intent was to provoke a motion for mistrial. 138
Again, in People v. Mitchell,13 9 the court found no intent to
provoke a mistrial when the prosecutor referred to the defendant
as a "pimp" in her opening statement. 140 Quoting Copeland, the
court held "'[a]bsent such a bad-faith intent, the misconduct does
not constitute that type of prosecutorial overreaching
contemplated by the United States Supreme Court as requiring
the barring of re-prosecution on the ground of double
jeopardy.' "141
In People v. May, the court was faced with the question of
whether or not the prosecutor's error was made with bad faith
intent.142 Without a long analysis, following the guidance of
132. Copeland, 127 A.D.2d at 847, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 950; People v.
Mitchell, 197 A.D.2d at 709, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 924.
133. 127 A.D.2d 846, 511 N.Y.S.2d 949.
134. Id. at 846-47, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
135. Id. at 847, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
136. Id.
137. Id. (holding that the "motion by the defendant for a mistrial was
appropriately granted in light of the prosecutor's repeated references to that 3
1/4-hour silence despite the instruction to the contrary by the trial court.") Id.
138. Id.
139. 197 A.D.2d 709, 602 N.Y.S.2d 923.
140. Id. at 709, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 924.
141. Id. (quoting Copeland, 127 A.D.2d at 847, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 949).
142. 644 N.Y.S.2d 525 (2d Dep't 1996).
1997] 743
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these earlier decisions, the court found that there was no showing
of bad faith intent. 143
In comparing the federal and state cases referred to by the May
court, the federal case explicitly stated the general rule for retrial
and two exceptions and the state court construed the second
exception on a case to case basis. In applying the second
exception, which allows for the preclusion of a retrial in some
circumstances involving misconduct by a prosecutor, the
Appellate Division, Second Department has construed it to
require a showing of bad faith intent. 144
SUPREME COURT
QUEENS COUNTY
People v. Gerstner 145
(decided February 2, 1996)
Defendant moved to dismiss felony charges arising out of
violations of Sections 1192(2)146 and 1192(3)147 of New York
143. Id.
144. See Copeland, 127 A.D.2d at 846, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 949; See also
Mitchell, 197 A.D.2d at 709, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 924.
145. 168 Misc. 2d 495, 638 N.Y.S.2d 559 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County
1996).
146. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(2) (McKinney 1996). Section 1192
(2) provides:
Driving while intoxicated; per se. No person shall operate a motor
vehicle while such person has .10 of one per cent or more by weight of
alcohol in the person's blood as shown by chemical analysis of such
person's blood, breath, urine or saliva, made pursuant to the provisions
of section eleven hundred ninety-four of this article.
Id.
147. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(3) (McKinney Supp. 1996). Section
1192(3) provides: "Driving while intoxicated. No person shall operate a motor
vehicle while in an intoxicated condition." Id.
6
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